Scammers Poison Official Support Pages via Google Ads
New Scam Variant Leverages Hidden URL Parameters
In a worrying evolution of tech support scams, malicious actors are now purchasing Google Ads for reputable companies—such as Microsoft, Apple, HP, PayPal, and Netflix—and appending invisible URL parameters that inject counterfeit phone numbers directly into the official support pages users visit.
“If you relied solely on the address bar to confirm you’re on an authentic site, this trick will slip right past you,” says Jérôme Segura, Lead Malware Intelligence Analyst at Malwarebytes.
How the Injection Works
When a user clicks a promoted result on Google Search, the displayed domain (for example, https://www.hp.com) is genuine, but the hyperlink actually points to:
https://www.hp.com/kb/index?page=search&q=☏Call%20Us%20+1-805-749-2108&locale=en_US
Because Google’s ad policy only shows the hostname (www.hp.com) and hides the appended query string, victims are none the wiser. Once the browser requests the URL, HP’s web server processes the q parameter and—due to insufficient input validation—renders the malicious phone number alongside official support content.
Technical Dissection of the Attack Vector
1. Malicious Google Ads Setup
- • Ad creatives target high-traffic keywords like “HP Support” or “Netflix Customer Service.”
- • Google displays only the domain, not the full path or query string.
- • Attackers exploit this by embedding HTML entities or JavaScript-friendly payloads in parameters.
2. Parameter Parsing on the Server
Most corporate support portals use server-side frameworks (e.g., ASP.NET, Java Spring MVC) that concatenate query parameters into the page template without a strict whitelist. A typical flow:
- User submits GET request with
?q=☏Call%20Us%20+1-805-749-2108. - Server-side rendering engine injects
qinto aortag. - Browser displays the fake number, styled identically to legitimate support text.
3. Browser Compatibility and Limitations
This technique works across major browsers—Chrome (Blink), Safari (WebKit), and Edge (Chromium)—because it relies purely on URL query parsing rather than exploiting a JavaScript or DOM vulnerability.
Deeper Analysis: Systemic Weaknesses
At its core, the scam leverages two oversights:
- Insufficient server-side input sanitization and parameter validation.
- Lack of URL path integrity checks to differentiate internal vs. third-party queries.
As Malwarebytes recently patched its own site by implementing a strict parameter filter (rejecting any q value containing non-alphanumeric characters), companies without similar Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules remain vulnerable.
Mitigation Strategies and Best Practices
Server-Side Protections
- Whitelist allowed query keys and strictly define acceptable value patterns with regular expressions (e.g.,
^[a-zA-Z0-9\s\-]{1,50}$). - Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) directives to restrict inline styles and scripts, reducing the risk of dynamic injection.
- Deploy a reverse proxy or WAF (e.g., ModSecurity, Cloudflare) with custom rules to detect anomalous payloads.
Client-Side Awareness
- Prefer organic search results over ads when seeking official support.
- Use browser extensions or security suites that flag unexpected DOM modifications.
- For enterprises, enforce DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and secure DNS filtering to block known scam domains.
Broader Implications for Web Security
This emerging threat highlights a blind spot in the current web ecosystem: UI integrity. Even sites with strong SSL/TLS certificates can be co-opted by URL-driven content injection if server logic blindly trusts query parameters.
“Address bar verification is necessary but not sufficient; we need end-to-end validation,” advises Dr. Elena Kirillova, Senior Security Architect at CyberShield Labs.
Until major ad platforms and content providers adopt stricter parameter transparency rules—such as Google showing full URLs or warning when query strings contain non-standard characters—users remain at risk.
Conclusion
The latest tech support scam underscores that security is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. By combining targeted advertising with lax server-side filtering, attackers have found a new vector to dupe even vigilant users. Companies must shore up their parameter parsing logic, and users should treat ads with heightened skepticism—especially when prompted to call a phone number shown on what appears to be an official site.